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CLOSING THE TECHNOLOGY GAP: 
DOES TRADE LIBERALIZATION REALLY  HELP? 
ABSTRACT 
A  common  theme in  discusssions  of trade reform  is the possibility of improved 
technical  efficiency  following  trade liberalization,  This paper presents a 
conceptual  analysis  of  the likely linkages between  trade regimes and technical 
efficiency.  Three  sets of  arguments, having  to do with  X-inefficiency, 
macroeconomic  instability,  and increasing returns to scale, are reviewed and 
found misleading  or incomplete.  A simple model of technological  catch-up by a 
domestic  firm  shows  the opposite of  the usual argument:  the larger market 
share provided  by protection  to the firm increases its incentives  to invest in 
technological  effort.  When  modified  to include oligopolistic  considerations 
at  home,  the model  suggests  that the incentives could go  either way, depending 
on the mode of  strategic  conduct.  The presence  of  economies  of scale provides 
perhaps  the strongest  reason  for productivity improvements,  but  here the 
argument  relies on frictionless entry into and exit  from industries.  The 
paper  concludes  that the relationship between trade policy  and technical 
efficiency  is fundamentally  ambiguous. 
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I.  Introduction 
The import-substitution  strategy's fall  into disrepute among  academics, 
and increasingly among policy-makers,  has been greatly  assisted by the 
discovery  that infant industries  spawned by the strategy have failed to 
mature.  It has become  increasingly clear  that indiscriminate  protection  of 
nascent  industries  yields few productivity  gains, and that the benefits  of  the 
strategy are unlikely  to offset  its costs  in terms of  resource misallocation, 
For this and other  reasons, "outward orientation"  has now become  the new 
orthodoxy.  The new strategy's Siren  song haa many refrains, but one which is 
particularly  appealing  is  the promise of  improved  technical efficiency  once 
protective  trade barriers are lifted.  With  trade  liberalization  set into 
motion,  policy-makers  are told, protected firms will  have  no  choice but to 
modernize their techniques and cut their costs  in order  to compete with 
foreign producers.  What is at stake is no longer  some Harberger  triangles, 
but hefty  rectangles  of  unexploited  technological  opportunities. 
The relationship between  trade policy  and technical efficiency  is an  old 
theme in  economics,  but one that has been  overshadowed  by the emphasis on  the 
Ricardian  doctrine  of comparative  costs.  The traditional case for comparative 
advantage  and free trade is one that stresses allocative  efficiency  (i.e.  the 
allocation  of domestic resources  into sectors where  they are most  productive); 
it is mostly  silent  on  technical efficiency.  Interestingly,  the original case 
for the gains  from trade-  -  as  articulated by Adam  Smith-  - relied on  overall 
gains  in productivity  deriving from  an expanded  division of  labor within  a -2- 
larger marketJ  This rationale  for trade--based on  scale economies--was 
hidden  from  the view  of academic economists by  the intellectual appeal of  the 
Ricardian  outlook, and has only  recently been  resuscitated  in the works  of the 
"new" trade theorists.2  But unlike  the Ricardian perspective,  the new one 
lacks a clean  model:  except  for the limiting case  where they  are "external"  to 
firms, scale economies must go hand  in hand  with imperfect competition.  The 
range of  possible  outcomes of trade policy then becomes limited only  by the 
analyst's  imagination. 
The hopes  for trade liberalization  are by  no means based only  on the 
exploitation  of  scale economies.  Protection  typically leads to the 
monopolization  of  the domestic  market by a few producers.  A common 
presumption  is that the resulting market  structures will  not be conducive  to 
improvements in  productivity  and technical efficiency.  Liberalization,  it is 
argued, would reverse the incentives.  Here we  bump  against one of  the oldest 
concerns of the literature  on industrial organization:  the relationship 
between  market  structure and innovation.  The ease with  which pro-liberalizers 
make their case is belied  by the continuing  debates in  this literature  about 
the nature of  the relationship.3  The Schumpeterian perspective  would disagree 
strongly with  the view that competition  is conducive to either  innovation  or 
I.  "By means of [foreign trade]  ,  the  narrowness of the home  market  does not 
hinder  the division of  labour n  any particular branch  of  art or manufacture 
from  being  carried to the highest perfection.  By  opening a more extensive 
market  for whatever  part  of  the produce of  their labour may exceed  the home 
consumption,  it encourages  them  to improve its productive  powers  Smith 
(1937  [1776]), Book  IV, chap.  I,  p.  415. 
2.  See Helpman  and Krugman  (1985) for an  integrated  treatment of trade theory 
with increasing  returns to  scale. 
3.  For an  excellent  analytical  survey, see Kamien and Schwartz  (1982). -3- 
cost reducing  investments. 
My objective  in this paper  is to clarify some of  the conceptual  issues  in 
the debate over  the relationship between  trade policy  and technical 
efficiency.  After  a brief  review of the arguments and the evidence  in the 
next section, I will devote  most of  my analysis to a set of highly  stylized 
models  that shed light on  different  aspects of the debate.  I  will argue that 
much current discussion has served only  to muddy  the waters  by inadequately 
distinguishing  between  trade policy proper  and other  (mostly macro)  policies 
deployed  in support of  outward orientation.  Once attention  is focused on 
trade policy,  it  becomes  extremely difficult  to sustain the case that 
liberalization,  as a general rule, must have a positive  impact on  technical 
efficiency.  The models  considered  here demonstrate  the fundamentally 
ambiguous  nature of the relationship. 
II.  The Arguments  and the Evidence 
The available  evidence suggests  that increases  in productivity  have 
played  an important role in  the economic growth  of  the developing  countries. 
But the contribution  of  productivity  change relative  to the growth  of  factor 
inputs has been typically not as high  as in developed  countries.  On average, 
the increase  in  total factor productivity  (TFP) accounts for about half of the 
growth  in  value added  in  developed economies;  the comparable  figure for 
developing  countries  is around  a third (see Table  1), 
Is there any reason  to believe  that choices with  respect  to trade 
strategy will have systematic  effects on the level of  technical  efficiency  and -4- 
its change over  time?  The straightforward  answer  is no.  The theory  of  trade 
policy  is generally  silent on  the effects of liberalization  on the rate of 
growth of output or  productivity.  The conventional benefits of liberalization 
are once-and-for-all  gains, and although such  gains can accumulate  over time, 
they  do not necessarily  put the economy on a superior path  of  technological 
development A 
To be  sure,  there is no shortage of arguments regarding how trade policy 
affect  domeatic  productivity. The above comments refer to  the lack  of  any 
general theoretical  presumptions; particular  stories do  abound.  Among  such 
stories,  three deserve special mention as the onea that come cloaeat  to 
satiafying  minimum  standards of  logical coherence,  and it is on  these  that I 
will focus  in  this section. 
X-efficiency.  The first set of  arguments revolve around  X-inefficiency. 
While the particular  rendition differs, the general theme here is that 
protection  makes  it more likely that  domeatic entrepreneurs  will auccomb to 
the "quiet  life" of the monopolist.  Why work  hard to improve productivity  and 
cut costa  if foreign competition  presents  little threat?  In its simplest 
form,  this argument relies on  satiaficing, rather  than optimizing, behavior  on 
the part  of  entrepreneurs,  and requires further that domeatic competition be 
not severe enough  of a threat  to keep  them  on their toes.  With  optimizing 
behavior,  it cannot  be  shown  in general that protection  weakena the pursuit  of 
higher  productivity.  In  fact, as I will  argue  in  the following  section,  the 
4.  The language  in the World  Bank's World  Develooment  Reoort.  198? (focusing 
on trade and industrialization)  reflects an  all-too  obvious tension between 
the desire to  make a positive case for liberalization  on  productivity  grounds 
and the need to acknowledge  that the theoretical  and empirical  support  for 
auch a caae is weak.  See pp. 90-92. -5- 
normal  case  would  be  quite  the opposite;  for an individual  firm, the larger 
marker  share provided  by trade restrictions  increases at the margin  the 
benefits  of cost improvements, and is likely  to  spur, not retard, 
technological  effort.  If  entrepreneurs  satisfice  instead, the presumed 
negative  effect  can indeed occur.  But the working  hypothesis  of  satisficing 
behavior would  require liberalizers to  sacrifice  too many  other beliefs held 
even  more firmly; for example, how many  of them  would be likely  to reject  the 
notion  that  devaluation  spurs exports, as they  must if entrepreneurs  are 
indeed  prone  to satisficing? 
A more satisfactory  theoretical explanation  for this hypothesis  is 
provided  by the possibility  that liberalization  may influence  the labor- 
leisure choice  of  entrepreneurs.  Suppose  that reducing X-inefficiency 
requires  constant effort and diligence, which  cuts into leisure.  Protection 
increases  the rents to entrepreneurs, who take some  of their increased  income 
in the form of leisure.  As  overall effort  declines,  technical efficiency 
settles on a lower path.  Liberalization  would  then reverse the process.  The 
definitive  analysis of  this question can be found in  Corden  (1974, pp. 224- 
231), who carefully disects the argument  and shows  its fragility.  Notice 
that this line of  reasoning  is valid  only when income effects outweigh 
substitution  effects,  i.e. when  the labor supply  curve of entrepreneurs  is 
backward-bending;  as indicated in  the preceding  paragraph,  the substitution 
effect  is likely  to go in the other  direction.  In addition, this argument has 
some  disconcerting  implications when viewed  in  general-equilibrium  terms; 
5.  I am grateful  to Howard Pack  for pointing me in Corden's direction. -6- 
liberalization  increases the incomes of exportera, who, by  the same reasoning, 
would be prone to  relax on  their technological  efforts.  I suspect that this 
contradicts  a widely  held  belief  to  the contrary.6 
Macroeconomic  instability.  The second major line of  reasoning  relies on 
the evidence  that inward-oriented  regimes are prone to  foreign exchange 
bottlenecks  and atop-go macroeconomic  cycles.  The instability in  the 
macroeconomic  environment  and the consequent  tendency for output to 
periodically  fall below  the full-capacity  level are certainly inimical  to 
growth in  measured productivity.  In addition,  the overvaluation  of the 
domestic  currency and shortagea of imported inputs diacourage  domestic  firms 
from  attempting  to reap the benefits of  scale via foreign markets.  t4hile 
these arguments have an  important kernel of  truth, they say practically 
nothing  about  the role of s.4.g policy  per se.  Conceptually,  any level  of 
trade protection  is compatible  with  macroeconomic  stability,  realistic 
exchange  rates, and the like.  The view  that protection  leads  to chronic 
current  account deficits mixes up macroeconomics  with  microeconomics. 
Indonesia,  for example, has had a very  restrictive  trade regime in  combination 
with exchange-rate  and macro policies  that are quite unobjectionable.7 
Similarly,  Korea  and Taiwan achieved macroeconomic  atability in  the l96Os 
6.  Corden  points out, rightly, that  the welfare consequences  of 
liberalization  are not necessarily  magnified  by  these X-efficiency effecta 
even  when entrepreneurial  labor supply  is backward-bending.  The reason  is 
that the additional  leisure taken by entrepreneurs  is part  of  social  welfare 
as well.  Rescuing  the argument then requires some additional hypotheses 
regsrding  externalities  and the like.  See also Selten  (1986) for s model  of 
imperfect  competition  in  which  "slack" is assumed  to increase with  profits. 
7.  For a fascinating  recent account see Woo and  Nssution  (1988). -7- 
without  any sizable  trade liberalization.8 
Current  terminology  ("outward orientation",  "export promotion  strategy") 
has the glaring shortcoming  that it lumps together macroeconomic  policies with 
trade policies.  Worse  still, the combination is  sometimes  referred to as  the 
"trade regime",  with  devaluation-cum-stabilization  episodes referred  to as 
"trade liberalization" . While  this terminology may  be useful for a 
deacriptive  categorization  of country experiences-  -exceptions  notwithstanding, 
restrictive  trade regimes do tend  to go hand in  hand  with  macroeconomic 
instability--it  confuses things for prescriptive  purposes.  When  inferior 
technological  performance  is due to mismanagement  of  macroeconomic  policy, 
countries  should be told to  change their exchange  rate and fiscal policies; 
the inclusion  of trade liberalization  in the policy  package- 
- sometimes  as  the 
lead  policy  initiative-  -gives the upper hand to ideology over  economics. 
Increasing  returns to scale,  The third line of argument is based  on 
economies  of scale.  More  open  trade regimes,  it is argued, are conducive  to 
lower overall costs  since domestic  firms can achieve larger  levels of  output 
by  participating  in  world  markets.  In  a broad  general-equilibrium  sense,  this 
is of course  true.  Small, open  economies are likely  to specialize  in a narrow 
range of products which  they can produce and export  at sufficient  scale  to be 
competitive.  In  more practical  terms, as long as trade liberalization  leads 
to an expansion  (on average> of  firms and sectors with increasing  returns to 
scale  (IRS),  the conventional  resource allocation benefits  are magnified  by 
8.  See Sachs  (1987) which  stresses  the distinction  and its importance  for the 
design  of macro  stabilization  policies. 
9.  See,  for example,  Papageorgiou, Michaely,  and Choksi  (1986) which 
summarizes  the findings of a  multi-country  study. -9- 
markets.  It is telling that all significant  cases of  export boom in 
manufactures--Korea  and Taiwan in  the l96Os, Brazil  in late l960s and 1970s, 
Turkey  in the l980s-  -  took  place well before any significant  trade 
liberalization  had been  attempted,11  The Chilen  trade liberalization,  on the 
other  hand, appears  to have  fostered exports of primary or primary-related 
products  with little  scope for IRS. 
In section V  below,  I will discuss some of  these arguments  further and 
show why trade restrictions do  not affect adversely  the export  incentives  of 
protected  firms.  What  is  true is that with  sufficiently  restrictive  levels of 
protection,  trade policy may end up  fostering  an industry which  is unable  to 
compete abroad  at  any level of output.  This,  then, is an  argument against 
"excessive"  protection,  rather than protection  per se,  The benefits from 
liberalization  in this instance will derive predominantly  from the contraction 
of industries with no  underlying comparative  advantage  in the conventional 
sense,  and not from an overall expansion of  production  runs and associated 
increases  in overall  productivity. 
To sunusarize,  I conclude that the first of  these arguments  (about X- 
efficiency)  is rather contrived,  the second  (about macro  stability)  is largely 
irrelevant  to trade policy, and the third  (about IRS) is potentially  important 
but incomplete.  I will return  to the more important of these arguments  below. 
What about the empirical evidence? 
Examining whether  any broad cross-sectional  correlations  emerge between 
11.  The experience  of these countries  strongly suggests that a realistic 
exchange-rate  policy  and a generous program of  export  subsidies,  rather  than 
trade liberalization  per Se,  are the key ingredients  for successful  export 
performance. -10- 
trade regimes and TFP growth has proved to be a tempting exercise.  A recent 
survey by Howard  Pack (1986) suggests that  the evidence  from such  studies  is 
quite  inconclusive:  "to date  there  is no  clear cut confirmation of the 
hypothesis  that countries with an  external orientation benefit  from  greater 
growth  in technical  efficiency  in  the corponent sectors of  manufacturing"  (p. 
38).  Bhagwati, a proponent of outward-orientation,  has also concluded 
recently  that there is little empirical or theoretical  aupport for favoring 
axport promotion  over  import  substitution on  grounds of  scale economies, 
technical  efficiency, or  innovation  (1988,  pp. 39-40).  In  any case,  the 
evidence  surveyed  by Pack  and Bhagwati does not directly bear on  the issues at 
hand,  since none  of  the studies discriminates  between trade policy  and macro 
policy  choicesj2  As argued  above, causality  cannot be  attributed  to trade 
policy  proper if  what  one understands  from  "trade regimes" is the entire 
complex of trade and payments policies.  To conclude,  then, there is no 
convincing  empirical  evidence that  less protectionist  trade policies  do better 
in  terms of technical efficiency. 
I now move  on  to a series of stylized models  that investigate  the 
relationship between  trade policy  and productivity.  In  light of the 
diacussion  above, my  objective will  be to  make simple points  in the context of 
simple models  rather  than to demonstrate  the validity of a single  general 
proposition. 
12.  The leading studies are Bhagwati  (1978, chap.  5), Chenery, Robinson  and 
Syrquin  (1986, chap. 6), Nishimuzu  and Robinson  (1984), and Krueger and Tuncer 
(1982). -11- 
III.  Protection  and Technoloeical  Catch-Up 
I  start with  a case which  shows the opposite of the orthodox  argument. 
consider  a firm  which  invests in  technological development  to cut its costs, 
and ask: how will the rate  of  increase of  productivity  depend on the level of 
trade protection  afforded  to the firm?  Once the backward  bending 
entrpreneurial  effort curve  is ruled out, the answer  is surprisingly  general. 
The larger  is the firm's market  share,  the greater is its investment  in 
productivity-enhancing  technology.  As long as protection  increases  the firms 
market  share,  then, trade restrictions  improve the level of  technical 
efficiency. 
Let the firm have  a monopoly at  home.  The case  of domestic oligopoly 
will be considered  in the next  section.  Its maximized  flow  profits can be 
written as 
(1)  ir(c,  a)  max  qp(q, a)  cq, 
q 
where c denotes  the firm's  (constant) marginal cost,  q its output, p(.) the 
inverse demond  function  it faces at  home, and a the quantity  of  imports 
alloyed  in  Import liberalization in this  context will refer to  increases  in 
m.  For  the  moment,  I  ignore  the  possibility  that  the  firm  may want to export. 
Let the foreign level of  marginal costa be  c*, with  c > c  initially.  The 
firm can  reduce  its costs  (all the way down to c*) by investing resources  in 
technology and overall  tinkering.  I model  this  by letting  the  firm choose  the 
rate  at which  domestic  costs decline, and denote  this rate  Then  at any 
point  in time,  the cost level is given by: -12- 
-ftt,  t<T, 
(2)  c(t) —  * 
c,  taT. 
Here T denotes  the time thst elapses before  the domestic  firm fully catches up 
with  foreign technology, and c0 represents the initial level of  domestic 
* 
costs.  This implies $  (l/T)(c0 
-  c  ), or: 
(3)  c(t)  c0 
-  (t/T)(c0 
-  0*),  for t  T. 
The present discounted  value  of  expenditures made  on technological  effort 
increases with $,  and can  be written simply as ($), with ' > 0 and '' >  0, 
What is of interest is the length of  time it takes for the firm  to csrch 
up with  foreign  technology.  Since both  c(t) and $ can  be written  as a 
function of  T, the firm's objective function can also  be stated as a function 
of T alone: 
(4)  V(T) — f  exp(-pt)ir(c(t),  m)dt  + J  exp(-pt)r(c*, m)dt 
- 
where  p is the firm's discount  fsctor.  After simplifying,  the first-order 
condition becomes: 
(5)  V'(T) - f  exp(-pt)tff0(c(t),  m)dt + '()  - 0. 
This  sets the marginal  cost  of  technological effort  equal  to the discounted 
sum of  its benefits  over  the catch-up period.  Notice that  equation  (I) 
implies ire — -q,  so that  the benefits of effort  are directly  proportional  to 
the scale of domestic output.  As long as '(.) is  finite  and strictly 
positive,  and assuming  the second-order condition  is  satisfied,  the catch-up 
is completed within  the open  interval (0, ). -13- 
To gauge the effects of trade policy, we can perform comparative  statics 
with respect to a.  Differentiating  (5) yields: 
(6)  dT/dm — -V' (flu (5 exp(-pt)tcm(.)dt}. 
Since the second-order  condition requires V'  (.) to be  negative,  the sign of 
this expression  depends solely on 
lrcm.  But from (1),  ircm  — -aq/am  so  that 
'cm is positive  as long  as import liberalization  (an increase in imports) 
reduces the output  of  the domestic firm.  Since this is the regular case, we 
can conclude that dT/dni > 0;  a more  liberal trade regime slows down the rate 
of increase of domestic productivity  and delays technological  catch-up.  The 
economic mechanism  at work  here is simple.  The larger  the scale  of  output, 
the greater  the benefits  to the firm  from a given reduction  in  costs.  Since 
import liberalization  shrinks the domestic firms sales,  it reduces  the 
incentive  to invest  in technological effort. 
The above  ignored two possibilities:  (a)  the domestic firm  may export, 
and (b) it may eventually  overtake  foreign competitors  in  productivity.  We 
can incorporate both  possibilities  in  the above framework by changing  the 
formulation  of technical  progress at home.  Suppose that the domestic  firm can 
set its own target  for the eventual  level of  productivity  it reaches,  c. 
This  target could  lie above or  below the foreign level of  productivity,  c. 
Its costs at any point  in time are now  written as follows: 
(7)  c(t)  c + (c0 
-  c)exp(-t) 
The firm reaches c asymptotically  as t->'.  We  now assume  is exogenous 
(1 > fi  >  0),  so that the firm's choice  variable is c.  We rewrite the cost 
function  for technological  effort as (c), with ' < 0 and '  > 0. -14- 
The firm's flow  profit  function is as in (1) when  it decides not to 
export.  When it does export, its flow profits are also a function of the 
foreign level of  costs, c*, so  csn be  written generally as  (c,  c*,  m).  As 
before, c  — -4,  the level of  total output (domestic sales and exports 
combined)  .  The  point in time at which the firm becomes an  exporter is 
determined  endogenously.  Let ' denote  the level of  productivity at which  the 
firm just breaks  even in world markets; & is  defined implicitly by the 
relation (, c*,  m) 
-  r(a,  m)  0.  When  costs are lower than E,  the 
firm's profits  from foreign sales add on to existing profits in the domestic 
market.  I will  only  look at  the case where it  pays to export eventually,  i.e. 
where the firm's target level of  costa (c) is lower than  .  As  long  as  c < 
&,  there  exists a finite length of  time,  T,  after which  the firm services 
both the domestic and the foreign markets.  T is determined  as follows: since 
—  +  (ce, 
-  Z)exp(-$T)  from (7), 
(8)  T — (l/fi)[ln(c0 
-  Z)  -  ln(& - 
The  firm's objective function can now be  stated as a function of  the 
target level of  productivity alone: 
(9)  V(c) — fj exp(-pt)(c(t),  m)dt + J exp(-pt)(c(t),  c, m)dt 
- 
with  c(t) and  T defined as in (7)  and (8).  The first-order condition can be 
simplified  to: 
(10)  f  exp(-pt)ir(l-exp(-$t))dt  + f  exp(-pt)[ 
- c]  -exp(-$t))dt - '  = 0. 
The marginal benefits of  innovation are now larger as they are spread over a 
larger scale of  output: Nc 
-  c1  represents the net increase in  output that - 15- 
is made possible through exports.  Hence the carrot of future exports adds to 
the incentive to enhance productivity. 
Once again, we can investigate the effects of import liberalization on  the 
rate of  technical progress.  Differentiation  of (10>  yields: 
(11)  dc/dm — -(V  )  [5 exp(-pt)(l-exp(-fltfldt 
+ J exp(-pt)cm(l-exp(-t))dt, 
where  I  have made use of the fact that  () -  0.  V' 
'  is  negative 
from  the second-order condition, so the sign of  this expression depends on the 
signs of cm  and cm  As long as  increased foreign competition reduces the 
total output of the domestic firm, dc/dm > 0,  and liberalization  is inimical to 
technical progress.  The explanation  is as before: while the export potential is 
now an  added  inducement for cutting costs, a  policy  that reduces the scale of 
domestic output diminishes the incentives to catch-up with foreign technology. 
Finally, let us  consider briefly the question of  temporary versus permanent 
protection.  Suppose the government commits itself to a path  of trade policy 
such that trade is liberalized after  a certain point in time,  r.  How does rhis 
affect  the behavior of the firm? 
Ignoring with no  loss of  generality  the role of exports, let the profit 
functions of  the  firm be written as  ir(c,  m) and T(c, a'), corresponding to  pre- 
nd  post-liberalization  periods.  Liberalization implies m' > m.  The firm 
maximizes  its  objective function: 
(12)  V(o) - J exp(-pt)s(c(t),  m)dt  + f( exp(-pt)s(c(t), m')dt 
- 
The  first-order  condition is: 16- 
(13)  f  exp(-pt)ac(1-exp(-$tfldt +  exp(-pt)c(1.exp(-$tfldt 
- ' 
—  0. 
We investigate what  happena when the liberalization ia brought forwatd in time 
(i.e.  r  ia reduced).  The comparative atatica yield: 
(14)  dc/dr - -(V'')  [exp(-pr)(l-exp(-rflJ  (mc(c(r), m)  - ffc(c(r), m')}. 
Since the level of  domeatic output is smaller when imports are liberalized 
c(T),  m)  - lrc(c(r), m') <0), we  have dc/dr < 0.  Shortening the period 
over which  temporary protection is granted reduces the firm's technological 
effort.  This  contradicts once again the conventional wisdom  regarding the 
productivity-boosting  effects of temporary, rather than  permanent, protection. 
In  sum, simple partial-equilibrium models of  technological catch-up point 
in  the direction diametrically opposed to arguments made by liberalizers.  While 
models of  the sort analyzed here need not be taken overly seriously as an actual 
description of  the process of innovation in  developing  countries, they certainly 
cast doubt on  the productivity-enhsncing effects of  trade liberalization. 
An  important caveat to this line of reasoning has to do with  the partial- 
equilibrium  nature of  the analysis.  Protection enhances  the profitability of 
firms in import-competing sectors, but acts as a tax on  firms in  exporting 
sectors.  Unless  there are under-utilized resources, protection cannot  expand 
output in  import-competing and exporting sectors simultaneously.  Consequently, 
productivity  gains in the former have to  be  weighed against foregone 
productivity  improvements in  the latter.  An important implication, therefore, 
is that the analysis above cannot be  used as a justification for indiscriminate, 
scrosa-the board protection.  A related caveat is that in the absence of  some 
knowledge regarding the externalitiea involved in  technological effort, we -17- 
cannot judge a faster technological catch-up induced by  protection  to be 
necessarily welfare-improving)-3  At  best, then, there is a case for selective 
protection of  industries where (a)  the catch-up potential is largest, and (b) 
there exist positive spillovers to the rest of  the economy)-4 
IV. The Role of Oligopoly 
The framework utilized above abstracted from interactions among competing 
firms in  the domestic market.  The new trade theory has stressed such 
interactions as an important determinant of  the effects of policy.  Accordingly, 
I now concentrate on  the implications of an  oligopolistic market structure at 
home.  The question to be  analyzed is the same as  before: how  does  protection 
influence the level of  technical efficiency of  firms? 
The  model  that follows illustrates a rather simple and intuitive story.  In 
an  oligopolistic  industry, incumbents could increase profits, in  the absence of 
perfect collusion,  if they could all somehow commit themselves to lower sales. 
In  practice, centrifugal  forces tend  to prove too strong, and firms waste some 
of their profits by "excessive" competition.  Now, one way that firms could 
credibly commit  themselves to less agressive behavior  is by choosing outdated or 
costly  technology.  By  maintaining costs artificially high, they could 
facilitate collusion. 
How does protection  affect all this?  As  the level of  protection  increases, 
13.  In  fact, when  no  such externalities exist, trade protection  can be  show-n 
to lead to  welfare  losses regardless of  its effect on  technological 
performance. 
14.  See Westpha].  (1982) for an  interpretation of Korean  technological 
development  in terms of selective promotion of  infant industries.  On  Korea, 
see also Dornbusch and  Park  (1987), pp. 402-406. -18- 
the profits  forgone by  excessive competition increase as  well, so  that the 
potential payoffs to a strategy of high  costs rise.  Therefore,  as long as 
firms'  strategic behavior  is conducive to an  increase in costs, protection 
serves to inflate costs even further.  Notice  that this argument is entirely 
different  from  any stated so far;  the adverse effect  on costs  is purely the 
consequence of the nature  of oligopolistic interactions among  incumbent firms. 
For the liberalizets, this is of course good news.  The bad  news is that the 
argument is extremely brittle,  As is common  in models of  oligopoly, it is easy 
to reverse  the result  by assuming a different mode  of behavior on  the part  of 
firms. 
To formalize the argument, let us consider a two-stage game being playod  by 
a pair  of  duopolists.  In  the first period, each firm undertakes  a certain 
amount of  investment  in technological effort, denoted by k  and k  respeotively, 
taking as given  the decisions of its rival.  In  the second, the firms oorpete in 
the domestic market.  At the beginning of  the second period,  k:  and k• are pre- 
determined,  and the profit function of  firm i looks as follows: 
(15) 
q1,  k)  p1(a, q1)q 
-  c1(q,  kt), 
where p'(.)  is the inverse demand function fared by firm  i,  and c  C U.  Fira 
j's profit function is symmetric.  For the moment  I  have supreseed imports; 
trade policy will  be discussed below in  terms of  changes in  the fora of  the 
inverse demand  function faced by  the firms.  The first-order  rondition is: 
(li)  4  + vi4 
= -19- 
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative with  respect to the relevant 
argument, and vL is firm i's conjecture  regarding how firm j will respond  to 
changes in the former's output (see Dixit,  1985).  Equation (16) and its 
analogue  for firm j  define a pair  of  best-response  functions q6(q  k6) and 
q(q  k) 
and an  equilibrium which is  a function only of  the predetermined 
investment levels k6 and 
kj.  Therefore,  the second period equilibrium can be 
expressed as  q1  q(k, k) 
and q 
— q(k,  k), 
In  the first period, firms are fully cognizant of the effects of their 
investment decisions on  the subsequent game, so choose k  and k  accordingly. 
Letting (.)  stand  for the cost of  investment  ('>O, ''>O), the problem for 
firm i is: 
(17)  Max  kj) 
- '(q(k6, ks). q(k, k1), k5) 
- 
If the firm takes its rival's decision as given, the first-order condition for 
is: 
(18)  (dq/dk6)  + e(dq/dk6)  +  - '  —  0. 
Notice  that firm j's output is sensitive to changes ink6 only insofar as the 
latter affects firm l's output.  So we  can write dq/dk 
— (dq/dq)dq/dk6. 
Let us define r  as the slope of firm j's best-response function, Le. rJ — 
(dq/dq). 
Then  dq/dk 
— ri(dq/dk6),  Now making use of (16), we can re- 
write  (18) as  follows: 
(19)  (r - v1)(dq/dk) 
+ (  - ')  —  0. 
The second  term in  parentheses  here captures the conventional trade-off between -20- 
the  costs and benefits of  technological effort,  in the abaence of oligopoliscic 
interactions, this would be the only  determinant of  the level of investment in 
technological development.  The first term,  on  the other hand, captures the 
atrategic  role of  the choice of technology, and it is on this that I  will now 
concentrate. 
Under  atandard assumptions, a decrease in  marginal costa will make a fitm 
produce more (dq/dk > 0)  and an  incmease in  the rival's output will hurt 
profits (a < 0), so  chat the sign of  the strategic effect depends solely on 
the sign  of (r2  - v1)  15  This term is the difference between the actual slope 
of  j's best-response  function and the conjecture entertained by i,  and is a 
familiar one in models of  oligopoly.  When  firms behave  too "agressively" in the 
second  period, vt will be negative and large, so that (r2 
-  vt)  > 0.  This is 
the presumption when  firms compete in  Bertrand fashion (setting prices and 
taking the price of the rival as given), for example.  In  this instance, the 
strategic  effect makes a  neaative contribution to  the first-order  condition in 
(19)  the optimal level of  k1,  will now be  than would have been  the case 
in  the absence of a strategic motive,  intuitively, it is in  the interest of the 
firm  to increase its  costs as this blunts some of its agcessiveness  in the 
second period.  And the same is true for its rival,  The profits  to the firma 
from  a consequently greater degree of  collusion can outweigh the losses  in 
productivity.  But from a social viewpoint, the costs of oligopoly are now 
exacerbated by  technical inefficiency. 
So far, this is standard maretial.16  The only new wrinkle comes with the 
15.  See Dixit  (1985)  for more on  this. 
16.  See in particular Dixit (1986) and Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperec -21- 
role of  trade policy.  How does trade liberalization affect the technological 
choice  in this framework?  First, and most obviously,  it affects the base level 
of  output  on which cost savings are distributed.  This is the effect  discussed 
in the previous section.  As  shown earlier, trade liberalization will reduce the 
incentive to increase productivity on  this account as long as domestic output is 
reduced.  This is captured in the present framework by a reduction in 
Secondly, and this is the key point, liberalization reduces the excess 
profits available in the home market, and therefore may be  expected to  de- 
emphasize  the strategic motive for under-investment  in technology.  The algebra 
here gets quite messy, but the point is simple enough.  As can be seen from 
(19),  the incentive to inflate costs is proportional to 
7t, 
which equals 
qi(aP'/8q) (see [15}).  In symmetric equilibrium  (3P1/aq) 
can also 
be  written as p1/c, where  is the price elasticity of  demand facing each firm. 
As the domestic market  is opened, we  expect p  to decrease and  to increase (in 
absolute value).  On  both  accounts, the strategic disincentive for technological 
effort becomes smaller.  In  the limit of  free trade,  goes to  negative 
infinity, so that the strategic disincentive disappears altogether. 
This line of  reasoning provides one possible rationale for why the 
oligopolistic market structures created by protection may create a bias  against 
technological effort,  But,  as stated at the outset, this argument is not 
particularly  robust.  It relies on  the possibility  that firms compete "too 
(1985), 
17.  Note  that  — -c.  A reduction in  domestic output therefore reduces 
as long as cq 
is negative,  i.e.  as long as  increased investment  in 
technology lowers  the marginal cost of  production. -22- 
agressively"  which  in che present frsework is captured by (r3 
-  v) > 0.  If 
inatead, firms have "consistent" conjectures  (ci  - vt — 0),  the strategic motive 
disappears and the considerations discussed above no longer come into play. 
Moreover, when  firms behave  in Cournot (quantity-setting) fashion, vt  0 and a 
negatively-sloped  reaction function (r2  < 0)  iaplies that the strategic 
incentive will work  to  enhance productivity)-8  With Cournot behavior  in the 
second petiod, there will be  -investsient  in technology as each firm would 
like to pre-oomisit  itself to a larger scale of  output.  Trade liberalization 
will now be doubly inimical to rechnologtcal performance. 
V.  The Role of  Economies of  Scale 
One of  the most  appealing arguments  for  trade liberalization  ia  the one 
that has been mentioned  at  the beginning of  the paper:  liberalization  may  foatet 
the  rationalization  of  industry structure by forcing inefficient  firms out.  The 
maintained hypothesis here  is that protection tends to crowd in too many firms 
producing at too low levels of  output. 
The industry-rationalization  argument relies  crucially on two feature:,  of 
the industty concerned:  (a)  economies of  stale, and (b)  free entry and exit.  in 
the prescore of  these two, there is indeed a very  good case for trade 
liberalization on the grounds of  productivity.  The argument goes as follows. 
With  free entry, the domestic price has to  equal the average cost of the 
representative  firm since incumbents cannot make  excess profits.  With IRS, 
average coats are a declining function of  firm-level output.  Therefore, any 
18.  See Eaton and  Grossman  (1986)  for a systematic discussion on the 
importance of  conjectures, -23- 
policy  which tends to increase the domestic price (e.g.  protection) will also 
increase the average cost level in the industry.  The mechanism that enables 
this is the entry of additional  firms, which squeezes the  output of  the 
incumbents and forces them up their average cost curves.  Conversely, 
liberalization reduces the domestic price and leads some of the incumbents to 
leave  the industry.  The remaining firms have to produce at sufficiently greater 
scale for the reduced level of average costs to match  the  lower domestic price. 
Notice that this industry-rationalization argument is based  on  partial- 
equilibrium  reasoning.  Once  the likely changes in relative factor prices are 
taken  into account, the force of the argument can be  blunted somewhat.  The 
reason  is that these factor-price changes are likely to dampen  (or reverse) the 
increase in  firm-level output as  prices fall.  Consider the following likely 
scenario for developing countries.  Suppose that the fixed costs of production 
(the basis  for IRS) consist primarily of  capital costs,  Then, if  trade 
liberalization reduces capital costs relative to wages sufficiently- 
- as  the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem would predict for developing countries-  'average costs 
at  unchanged  output levels could fall so  much that restoring the equality 
between price and average cost nay require a reduction in the scale of 
production  of  the typical firm.  The consequence, paradoxically, may be  de' 
rationalization  (see Brown and  Stern, 1988). 
Barring these general-equilibrium complications, the cost savings from 
industry rationalization can greatly magnify the traditional gains from 
liberalization  (Harris, 1984).  In an  earlier paper, I carried Out some simple 
partial-equilibrium  simulations for three Turkish industries to assess the 
likely welfare effect of  pertial quota liberalization under various scenarios of 
market conduct (Rodrik, 1988).  The existence of  IRS was assumed in each  case, -24- 
and modeled by incorporating aome fixed coats of  production.  Table 2 
summarizes  the relevant results for the case of  Cournot conjectures.  The 
numbers highlight  the crucial role of free exit, when  such exists.  In  all 
cases, the industry rationalization promoted by  exit adds a considerable boost 
to the overall welfare effect, turning a negative outcome into a posittve ons in 
one instance. 
In the presence of free entry and exit,  a rather similar outcome could 
obtain even  when IRS is not particularly important, as long as firms differ  in 
their levels of  productivity.  There is evidence that such differences may he 
quite important in some developing countries and in some industries  (Page, 
1984)  .  Large differences  in producriviry are of  course sustainable only with 
trade protection.  Under free entry, the domestic price equals the average cost 
of the marginal firm.  With  liberalization, the least efficient firms have to 
exit until  the new  marginal firm is defined by the level of  productivity which 
equates its average cost with  the (lower) domestic price.  Just  as in the IRS 
case, the average level of  productiviry rises with liberalization. 
gnthuaiaam for such arguments, however, has to be tempered by  realisa ahnur 
marker circumstances  in developing countries.  In practice, fricrionless entry 
and exit  are likely  to be the exception rather than the rule.  Exit is 
particularly problematic, as it implies a well-developed secondary market in 
capital equipment: if  firms cannot dismantle and sell their operations-  -in other 
words,  if capital is sunk--the productivity benefits of liberalizarion can be 
easily canceled.  Firma will  not exr  until prices fall below average variable 
cost, and may not even  do so then if they are cross-subsidized by affiliates  in 
other sectors.  On the other aide of the ledger, depreciation of  machinery  and 
equipment may provide a natural form of  exit over rime.  Market charades aside, -26- 
(20)  L — p(q m)q  +  -  F  - c(q +  +  A(Q  -  qd 
-  qx  + dd + 
where  is the (exogenous) world  price, A is the Lagrange multiplier for the 
capacity constraint,  and Md  and Mx  are the respective multipliers  for the non- 
negativity constraints.  The first-order condition for exports is: 
(21)  p 
-  c  - A+PxO• 
We can now distinguish  two cases.  In  the first, p  < c  so  exports would nor 
even  cover marginal costs.  Then x  >  0  and  — 0.  But when p ￿  c,  exports 
are worthwhile  — 0),  so  that the firm increases its export sales all the way 
until  the capacity constraint is hit and A > o.20 
Notice  that the firm's export incentives are not adversely affected by 
circumstances  in  the domestic market, and in  particular by  the extent of  trade 
protection.  If  anything, trade protection is conducive to  exports in the 
following sense: protection allows the firm to make  some excess profits at home 
which can  be used  to cover its fixed costs; exports then  become attractive  even 
if the world  price is aw  the firm's average cost (case two above). 
Protection allows some exports in a sector where, in  the absence of  proroctioc, 
there may nnr have been any  domestic production to begin with. 
When  we relax the assumption of  constant marginal costs, the case for 
protection becomes even  stronger.  Suppose that IRS rakes the form  of  decreasing 
marginal costs.  Now protection allows the home firm to increase irs domestic 
sales,  and therefore to reduce its marginal cost.  With  a lower marginal cost, 
20.  This  assumes that the firm finds it profitable  to produce in  the home 
marker. -27- 
the firm can become more competitive  in world markets, and therefore increase 
its exports  as well,  This is Krugman's  (1984) model of  import protection  as 
export  promotion"  The sheltered home market  provides the domestic firm  with 
the cost savings needed  to compete with  larger  rivals in  world markets.  Notice 
that this is a vision diametrically opposed to the one where free entry crowds 
in too many firms operating at high  cost.  Which story one believes in  depends 
on  one's priors regarding the ease of  entry and exit and the effectiveness  of 
entry restrictions imposed by governments. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
My  objective in  this paper was to identify some of  the arguments commonly 
made regarding the trade-productivity nexus,  and to  hold  them to the analytical 
light.  I have argued that many  of  these arguments lack coherence.  We  are far 
from having  any systematic theories which link  trade policy to technical 
efficiency.  In particular, we do  not have any good reason to expect that trade 
liberalization will  generally be  helpful  to overall technological performance. 
The usual call for more empirical  evidence is perhaps more appropriate  in 
this instance than in any other.  As  more countries experiment with  trade 
reform, the universe of empirical studies should broaden.  The challenge. 
however,  is to escape  the identification problem which has plagued all previous 
studies.  In  practice, the arguments for following sensible macroeconomic 
policies--realistic  exchange rates and  moderate fiscal deficits, in  particular-- 
are too often confused for arguments on  behalf  of  trade liberalization.  Partly 
as a result, countries that reform their trade policies often do  so in the 
context of  macro stabilization programs.  When  stabilization alleviates  the 
foreign exchange bottleneck  and capacity utilization  increases, industry -28- 
typically experiences  an increase in its measured productivity level.  It 
becomes  tempting to credit the improved productivity performance  to trade 
policy. 
Until more evidence becomes available, then,  a healthy skepticism  is in 
order.  In  the meantime,  if truth-in-advertising  were to apply to policy advice, 
each prescription for trade liberalization would be  accompanied with  a 
disclaimer:  "Warning!  Trade  liberalization cannot be shown to enhance technical 
efficiency; nor has it been  empirically demonstrated to do so." -29- 
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Table  1:  The Comparative Role  of  Total  Factor Productivity  (TFP) 
(percent)  Growth  of  TFP:  factor  inputs: 
value added  growth  share  growth  share 
Average  for 
developing  countries  6.3  2.0  31.0  4.3  69.0 
Average  for 
developed  countries  5.4  2.7  49.0  2.7  51.0 
Source:  Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin  (1986), Table 2-2. Welfare Effects* with: 
fixed nuaber  of  firms 
free exit 
-32- 
Table  2:  Effects of  Partial Trade  Liberalization with  Scale Economies, 
Turkey  c.  1980 
Electrical 
Autos  Tires  appliances 
2.6  0.6 
5.2  4.1 
-0.5 
1.2 
*  .  . 
ijo.le:  Increase in  welfare,  measured as a share of  base consumption, arising 
from  a ten percent quota  liberalization. 
Source:  Rodrik  (1988), Tables  5,  6, and  7. 